混合所有制改革：治理效应还是资源效应？——基于不同产权性质下企业投资效率的研究

《上海财经大学学报》 2021年23卷第1期 页码：75 - 90  online：2021年1月23日

混合所有制改革：治理效应还是资源效应？——基于不同产权性质下企业投资效率的研究

Mixed Ownership Reform: Governance Effect or Resource Effect? Research on Enterprise Investment Efficiency Based on Different Property Rights

作者（中）：赵璨1, 2, 3, 宿莉莎1, 曹伟1, 2, 3 *

作者（英）：Zhao Can1, 2, 3, Su Lisha1, Cao Wei1, 2, 3 *

作者单位：1.中国海洋大学 管理学院，山东 青岛 266100 2.中国海洋大学 中国企业营运资金管理研究中心，山东 青岛 266100 3.中国海洋大学 中国混合所有制改革与资本管理研究院，山东 青岛 266100

摘要：现阶段，中国企业混合所有制改革不仅包括国有企业引入非国有资本，而且还包括国有资本参股非国有企业。文章以2010-2016年中国A股上市公司为研究样本，研究了不同产权性质的企业混改与投资效率的关系。实证研究发现，混合所有制改革显著提高了企业投资效率。对于国有企业而言，非国有资本的引入降低了企业过度投资；对于民营企业而言，国有资本的参股缓解了企业投资不足。传导机制的研究发现，国有企业混合所有制改革降低了股东与经理层之间的代理成本，表现出混改的“治理效应”；而民营企业的混合所有制改革降低了企业融资约束，表现出混改的“资源效应”。进一步研究发现，国有企业混合所有制改革对投资效率的改善作用在内部控制质量较低样本中更为明显，民营企业混合所有制改革对投资效率的改善作用在政府干预程度较强的地区更为明显，进一步证实了混合所有制改革在不同产权性质企业中的不同效应。

关键词：混合所有制改革; 投资效率; 治理效应; 资源效应

Summary: It is an important strategic measure for China’s economic transformation and upgrading to give full play to the value of different property rights capital, activate the vitality of enterprises and realize high-quality development. At present, introducing non-state capital into state-owned enterprises, and state-owned capital sharing in non-state enterprises are two main ideas for developing mixed ownership economy. The mixed ownership reform of enterprises is mainly manifested as “governance effect” and “resource effect”. Does the mixed ownership reform of Chinese enterprises play a governance effect, a resource effect, or both? For the study of the above problems, this paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies in 2010 and 2016 as research samples, and manually collects the detailed information of the top ten shareholders. Based on the unique dual ownership structure in China and the characteristics of mixed ownership reform of enterprises with different property properties, the index system of mixed ownership reform of enterprises with different property properties is constructed, and the relationship between mixed ownership reform and investment efficiency of enterprises with different property properties is studied.The empirical study finds that the mixed ownership reform significantly improves the investment efficiency of enterprises. For state-owned enterprises, the introduction of non-state capital reduces the over-investment of enterprises. For private enterprises, the participation of state-owned capital alleviates the lack of enterprise investment. The study of transmission mechanism finds that the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises reduces the agency cost between shareholders and managers, showing the “governance effect” of mixed ownership reform. However, the mixed ownership reform of private enterprises reduces the financing constraints of enterprises and shows the “resource effect” of mixed ownership reform. Further research shows that the improvement effect of mixed ownership reform on investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises is more obvious in the samples with lower quality of internal control. The effect of mixed ownership reform on the investment efficiency of private enterprises is more obvious in regions with strong government intervention, which further confirms the “governance effect” of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises and the “resource effect” of mixed ownership reform of private enterprises. This study not only enriches the relevant research on the economic consequences of mixed ownership reform in Chinese enterprises, but also provides some policy inspiration for the government to promote the reform of mixed ownership and develop mixed ownership economy.

Key words: mixed ownership reform; investment efficiency; governance effect; resource effect

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2021.01.006

收稿日期：2020-10-4

基金项目：国家社会科学基金重点项目“竞争性国有企业混合所有制改革的现实困境与理论突破”（16AJL007）；国家自然科学基金青年项目“民营企业寻租、政治资本猝变及经济后果研究?基于官员落马的视角”（71702178）；国家社会科学基金青年项目“基于企业政治嵌入理论视角下的政企关系重构研究”（18CJY025）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金“反腐败、政企关系重构与企业社会资本投资：基于社会关系网络理论的整合研究”（17YJC790005）

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