竞争中性的国际规制演进与中国因应策略——以美欧互诉“民用大飞机补贴案”为参照

《上海财经大学学报》 2021年23卷第1期 页码：138 - 152  online：2021年1月23日

竞争中性的国际规制演进与中国因应策略——以美欧互诉“民用大飞机补贴案”为参照

Evolution of International Competition Neutrality Regulations and China’s Reaction: With Reference to the Large Civil Aircraft Subsidy Disputes between the US and the EU

作者（中）：李俊峰

作者（英）：Li Junfeng

作者单位：1.上海大学 法学院，上海 200444

摘要：历时15年的美欧互诉民用大飞机补贴案表明，在国家竞争与商业竞争的交融领域，尤其是在关涉国家安全的战略性产业领域，即使是高度信奉自由市场竞争的法域也并不固守竞争中性的守夜人角色。国际市场竞争所产生的效率和福利，既可能普惠全球，也可能具有浓重的民族国家属性和政治利益色彩。世贸组织是广受世界主要经济体接受的反补贴救济平台，对维系全球市场竞争中性发挥着关键作用，但其在竞争中性国际规制体系中的地位存在被边缘化的风险，竞争中性国际规制体系存在内国法化、国家企业概念存在泛化的倾向。在国际和国内市场维护和实施竞争中性，是我国主动扩大开放、加快建设更高水平开放型经济新体制的内在要求。为此，我国应构建符合普遍学理原则，与自身控制力、承受力相适应，满足国家整体利益最大化需要的竞争中性制度体系，以及对竞争中性国际规制风险的管控制衡机制。

关键词：竞争中性; 大飞机; 补贴; 规制

Summary: It took 15 years for the WTO to make a ruling on the case between the United States and the European Union to sue each other for subsidies to large civil aircraft, which concluded that both sides had implemented illegal subsidies to their respective large aircraft industries. This case shows that in the fields where national competition and commercial competition are intertwined, especially in the strategic industries related to national security, even the jurisdictional authorities who highly believe in free market competition do not play the role of a night watchman sticking to competition neutrality. The efficiency and welfare generated by competition in the international market may not only benefit the world, but also have strong national-state attributes and political interests. It may be regarded as a rational policy choice related to national interests and political correctness to devote one country’s efforts to build local enterprises into “national champions” and help them defeat foreign rivals in industries of great strategic significance. As an anti-subsidy relief platform widely accepted by the world’s major economies, the WTO plays a key role in maintaining the competitiveness of the global market, but its position in the international competition neutrality regulation system is at risk of being marginalized. The international competition neutrality regulation system has a tendency to legalize domestically, and the concept of state-owned enterprises has a tendency to generalize to state-supported enterprises. As far as China is concerned, maintaining and implementing competition neutrality in the international and domestic markets is the product of reforms forced by external pressures, and it is also an inherent need for China to actively expand opening up and accelerate the construction of a new higher-level open economic system. China should make competition neutrality the core content of its competition policy, take into account the construction of soft competition law and hard competition law, and break down the barriers that restrict the common development and fair competition of various market entities. However, when a certain type of enterprise is the most preferred among various carrier tools to achieve specific important value goals of the country, it can be considered to be exempt from competition neutrality regulations. In principle, China’s competition neutrality system should be compatible with its own control and endurance, meet the needs of maximizing the country’s overall interests, and enhance policy transparency and procedural legitimacy. The mechanism of bilateral or regional trade agreements and the anchoring mechanism of deeply embedded and integrated Chinese and foreign economies may be helpful to control and balance the risks of international competition neutrality regulations.

Key words: competition neutrality; large aircraft; subsidies; regulations

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2021.01.010

收稿日期：2020-11-12

基金项目：国家社科基金项目“竞争中性的中国规制体系研究”（19BFX162）

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